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ABSTRACT 
Two theoretical approaches – Conventions and Institutional Logics – are brought together and the 
similarities and differences between the two are explored. It is not the intention to combine the 
approaches, but I would like to open both ‘boxes’ and make them available to each other with the 
purpose of creating a space for dialog. Both approaches were developed in the mid-1980s as a 
reaction to rational-choice economic theory and collectivistic sociological theory. These two 
theories were oversimplifying social life as being founded either in actor-micro level analyses or in 
structure-macro level analyses. The theoretical quest of both Conventions and Institutional Logics 
has been to understand the increasing indeterminacy, uncertainty and ambiguity in people’s lives 
where a sense of reality, of value, of moral, of feelings is not fixed. Both approaches have created 
new theoretical insights by overcoming traditional micro-macro and actor-structure dimensions. 
However, they have also achieved this in different ways and I ask if there is a benefit to ‘importing’ 
some of these differences into the other approach. 
   
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
People and organizations increasingly navigate situations where there is no common sense of 
reality, value, moral or feelings. And they often have to coordinate their activities in indeterminate, 
uncertain and ambiguous situations. A quest to understand the phenomenon has been on the social 
science agenda in the last three decades – and even earlier too. Theoretical approaches such as 
Ambiguous Decision Making (March, 1976), Dilemmas of Identity (Gergen, 1991), Paradox and 
Transformation (Quinn and Cameron, 1998), Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 1993), Conventions 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991/2006), and Institutional Logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991) have 
all explored how people and organizations navigate in indeterminate, uncertain and ambiguous 
situations.  
I want to bring two of these theoretical approaches together in this paper: Conventions and 
Institutional Logics. Although the two approaches have differences, I believe they have much to tell 
each other. Both emerged at the same time in the late 1980s, the first in France and the latter in the 
USA. Very little dialog has taken place between the two. It’s only recently that attempts have been 
made to bring them together, i.e. at a workshop in Innsbruck 2013 with the presence of Laurent 
Thévenot and Roger Friedland, and through a few articles. In some of these articles, Clotier and 
Langley (2013), as well as Dansou and Langley (2012), focus on how Conventions complements 
Institutional Logics by helping it address its limitations – and the former article also offers a short 
rapprochement between the two approaches. McInerney (2008) deals with how institutional 
entrepreneurs promote narratives to shape organizational fields by anchoring the narratives to moral 
ideologies, encapsulated in orders of worth (Conventions). Patriotta, Gond and Schultz (2011) look 
at how organizations and stakeholders debate and discursively justify the legitimacy of an 
institution when controversies arise and several forms of legitimacy are brought into play. They 
argue that the current institutional theories (including Institutional Logics) have not paid sufficient 
attention to this issue, and instead they build on insights from the Conventions approach. In this 
paper I specifically focus on a comparison between Conventions (as developed by Boltanski and 
Thévenot) and Institutional Logics (as developed by Friedland and Alford, as well as Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury).
1
 I look at similarities and differences, make comments, ask questions of 
both approaches, and highlight some elements where the two approaches may learn from each 
                                                          
1
 Some scholars have been interested in the relationship between Conventions and different notions of institutions (e.g. 
economic neo-institutionalism and sociological neo-institutionalism). As Institutional Logics is a specific approach of 
institutionalism, I do not include the works by these other scholars in this paper (e.g. Annisette and Richardson, 2011; 
Daudigeos and Valiorgue, 2010; Dias-Bone, 2012; Gond and Leca, 2012; Knoll, 2013; Kädtler, 2012).  
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other. It is not my intention to combine the approaches, but I would like to open both ‘boxes’ and 
make them available to each other to promote a dialogue between them. 
The paper is structured in the following way: I start by describing Conventions and Institutional 
Logics. Then I compare the two approaches, focusing on similarities and differences. After that I 
comment on what one approach may learn from the other (and vice versa), and I raise some 
questions about each of the approaches. 
 
CONVENTIONS 
The Conventions approach was developed in France by Boltanski and Thévenot, who elaborated 
their arguments in the 1980s. They published their joint work De la Justification: Les Économies de 
la Grandeur in 1991. Conventions developed as a critique of two roots in sociology: one tradition – 
rooted in Durkheimian sociology – where the ordering principle rests on the notion of the collective, 
and another tradition rooted in the economic model where the ordering principle rests on the results 
of individual choices. Conventions offered a third approach, developing a model focusing on the 
relationship between moments of agreement reaching and moments of critical questioning 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 25).
2
 Their project is the understanding of what they call the 
principle of common humanity, where people ‘seek to carry out their action in such a way that these 
can withstand the test of justification’. (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 37/38). They focus on 
everyday interactions where disputes are raised and agreements are reached. And they argue that 
there is an inner tension between one side which is based on reaching agreements where something 
is ranked, and another side where there is a principle of equality.   
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006) describe how individuals confront uncertainty by making use 
of objects to establish order and, conversely, how they consolidate objects by attaching them to the 
orders constructed. The ‘states of worth’ of a person cannot be predetermined; people have to 
interact and reach an agreement in order to discover their relative worth in the world – if they do not 
resort to violence, that is. Boltanski & Thévenot identify different principles of order that help 
people reach agreements. These agreements have to be enacted; in real-world tests they involve 
objects in relation to which people measure themselves and discover their relative worth in the 
world. Therefore, an agreement is not just a linguistic phenomenon as the notion of objects and tests 
                                                          
2
 For a discussion about the position of the approach in French post-war sociology and its specific relation to the work 
by Bourdieu and actor-network theory, see Bénatouïl (1999), Wagner (1999) and Guggenheim and Potthast (2012). 
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play a central part in their argument:  
In opposition to ‘the linguistic turn’, it (Conventions) inclines toward realism. Indeed, 
for persons to be able to reach an agreement in practice, not only in principle, a reality 
test has to take place, accompanied by a codification or, at least, an explicit formulation 
of valid proof. In order to be able to take these proofs into consideration, the model of 
analysis must be able to enlighten the presence not only of persons – the sole beings of 
political philosophy – but also of objects. We do consider the reality test to require the 
capacity of persons to take these objects at face value and to endow them with value. 
Therefore, every principle of justice is associated with a universe of objects that 
constitute a coherent world. (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2000: 212/3).  
Boltanski and Thévenot don’t deal with objects as pure carriers of symbolic meaning: 
We want, on the contrary, to show the way persons, in order to cope with uncertainty, 
rely on things, objects, devices which are used as stable references, on which reality 
tests or trials can be based. These reality tests enable judgments to reach a grounded and 
legitimate agreement and, hence, provide the possibility of ending the dispute. 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 367).  
Relying on classic works of political philosophy, the authors identify six coherent worlds, each of 
which has its own norms of appropriate behavior that the people in them follow. The six worlds are: 
1. the inspired world; 2. the domestic world; 3. the world of fame; 4. the civic world; 5. the market 
world; and 6. the industrial world.    
In the inspired world, the common principle is inspiration, and the state of worthiness is spontaneity 
and excitement. Your dignity as a human being goes through passion and creativity and the subjects 
are often defined as poor and sometimes useless within the society. The mind and body are the 
objects in this world, the test is the vagabondage of mind, and the evidence is signs. What you 
sacrifice are habits, and your fall will be evident if you are down to earth. In the domestic world, the 
common principle is personal relations and you show your state of worthiness by demonstrating 
good manners, and being wise and trustworthy. Your dignity as a human being is shown through 
habits and kindness, and the subjects in this world are e.g. fathers, parents, mothers, friends, and 
guests, etc. But the domestic world not only unfolds within a restricted notion of ‘the family’, but 
also highlights the personal relationship between people outside ‘the family’. Objects in the 
domestic world are gifts in order to support the relations, and the test is to participate in ceremonies 
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and social events, and the evidence is appreciation. What you sacrifice is selfishness. You invest in 
your duties, and you fail if you behave in a vulgar or impolite way. In the world of fame, the 
common principle is reputation and your state of worthiness is when you are famous and visible. 
Your self-love and desire to be seen and heard are fundamental to your dignity as a human being, 
and the subjects in the world of fame are stars and their fans. The objects are branding and 
interviews, and the test is your ability to present yourself under the gaze of others as well as the 
evidence is to ‘be known’. What you sacrifice are your secrets, and you fail if you remain unknown. 
In the civic world, the common principle is collectivity and your state of worthiness depends on 
your public agency. Involvement in public affairs shows your dignity as a human being and the 
subjects in this world are delegates, representatives, and members. Some of the objects are laws, 
courts, and policy – and the test is attending meetings. The evidence is rules and legal texts. What 
you sacrifice is your individuality, and your fall will be evident if you become a free rider. In the 
fifth world – the market world – the common principle is possession of rare goods and competition. 
You show your state of worthiness in terms of being rich and living the high life. The desire for 
commodities is central to your dignity as a human being. In the market world, subjects are 
individuals, clients, competitors, buyers, sellers, and businessmen – and the objects are wealth, 
luxury items, and money. The test of belonging to this world is when you make deals, and the 
evidence is money. What you sacrifice is attention to others, and you fail if you become enslaved by 
money (and not your desires). In the industrial world, the common principle is efficiency, 
productivity, and needs. You show your state of worthiness by being predictable and reliable, and 
your dignity as a human being is defined by work and activities. The subjects of the industrial world 
are professionals and specialists, and the objects are means, tools, definitions, and concepts. The 
test in this world is verification and the evidence is measures, etc. The sacrifice you make is the 
ability to relate to other people as human beings, and you fail if you become instrumental and treat 
people like objects.  
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999: 369) mention that these worlds are historical constructions. Some of 
them may be grounding people’s justification less and less, whereas other worlds may be emerging, 
e.g. a green world or a communicative world. A projective world is also mentioned by Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005) (see also Gond & Leca, 2010), and Westenholz (2013a) suggesting a fuzzy 
world based on Eastern philosophy. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005) investigate how orders are changing or emerging. They argue that the principal operator of 
creation and transformation of an order is critique (voice), which derives its energy from sources of 
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indignation. “Displacements make it possible to restore strength by deriving less identified forces 
from new circumstances in which those who bring them about are placed.” (499). These shifts are 
neither seen as the outcome of an overall strategy developed and implemented from above, nor are 
they an unconscious process, without a subject or reflexivity. They are understood as interpretable 
in terms.       
Disputes can take place within a world without calling the world itself into question (e.g. the 
question ‘Who is the best qualified in the industrial world?’ does not challenge the industrial world 
per se). The disputes revolve around the issue of whether or not the test is genuine. However, the 
world itself might be challenged, subsequently leading to the confrontation of two or more worlds. 
What is described here does not refer to a person tested in different ways, in different situations 
(e.g. a person is tested in a concrete situation, for example as a company employee in the market 
world, and as a family father in the domestic world). What is referred to, is a situation where a 
person is tested in different worlds within the same scenario, e.g. do you have to pay (the market 
world) your child (the domestic world) to mow the lawn?   
One of Boltanski & Thévenot’s main arguments is that people often manifest themselves in 
different worlds:   
Although the room to maneuver is strictly limited by the way the situation is 
arranged, a model incorporating several worlds gives actors the possibility of 
avoiding a test, of challenging a test’s validity by taking recourse in an external 
principle, or even of reversing the situation by introducing a test that is valid in a 
different world. The model thus includes the possibility of a critique for which 
determinist constructions fail to account. (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 216).   
When several worlds are brought together in the same test scenario, no higher common order can be 
found to resolve the disagreement. As Boltanski & Thévenot mention, a disagreement might not be 
stated as people might choose to ignore it (234), or the worlds might not be in conflict in the 
specific situation. Alternatively, a compromise may be suggested where “people agree to come to 
terms, that is, to suspend a clash – a dispute involving more than one world – without settling it 
through recourse to a test in just one world.” (277). Let me exemplify. In a situation where both the 
market world and the civic world are present, a compromise might be established. For example, in 
some countries representatives of employees have the right to participate in board meetings together 
with the representatives of the capital owners. Such a compromise has been worked out in 
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Scandinavian countries and has been named ‘citizens in companies’, a compromise or hybrid 
between the two worlds. In other parts of the world – Great Britain and the USA, for example – this 
compromise is seen to be a strange, unnatural phenomenon. Compromises are often fragile. But as 
Boltanski & Thévenot suggest:   
a way of solidifying a compromise is to place objects of elements stemming from 
different worlds at the service of the common good and endow them with their 
own identity in such a way that their form will no longer be recognizable if one of 
the disparate elements of which they are formed is removed. (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 278).   
Boltanski and Thévenot are well aware that their model of Conventions does not cover all 
circumstances of behavior. First, when people work together, they are not always focused on justice 
and compromises. They may enact private arrangements instead. A private arrangement is a 
contingent agreement between two parties that refers to their mutual satisfaction rather than to a 
general good i.e. “you do this, which is good for me; I do that, which is good for you.” (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006: 336). The term ‘private’ does not refer to a particular sphere (e.g. the domestic or 
market world). It suggests something that ignores the common good. It is in private arrangements 
that interests are defined. Although a compromise does not have a solid foundation, it does 
presuppose an idea of the common good, and that is what distinguishes it from a private 
arrangement. 
Second, people may be engaged in other regimes than public affairs. As Thévenot mentions (2001, 
2013), they may be engaged in familiarity where individual interests or opinions are less demanding 
for coordination, whereas the demands for intimacy are necessary. They may also be engaged in a 
plan that involves projection of the self, outside intimacy and ensuring of self-projection in the 
future. When people are engaged in familiarity, or in a plan, they are interacting with the 
environment in situations where they do not have to justify to others what they are doing, and their 
behavior is not institutionalized. I will not deal with these other types of engagements but use them 
to specify that the regime of justification is only one among other regimes. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
The Institutional Logics approach was developed in the USA by Friedland and Alford who 
elaborated their arguments in the 1980s (Alford and Friedland, 1985) and published their joint 
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article Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions in 1991 – the 
very same year that Boltanski and Thévenot published their book on conventions. The Institutional 
Logics developed explicitly as a critique of two roots in social sciences: one tradition rooted in the 
concept of the utilitarian individual (found in the public-choice theory, agency theory, rational-actor 
models, and new institutional economics), and the other tradition rooted in power-oriented 
organizational theory e.g. resource dependency theory, which autonomozes organizations from their 
institutional environment. Today, one could also argue that Friedland and Alford implicitly 
criticized a deterministic tendency within neo-institutional organizational theory that focuses on 
organizational isomorphism and a lack of organizational diversity (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1983).          
Friedland & Alford (1991) argue that the interests, identities, values, worldviews, and material 
practices of individuals and organizations are embedded in institutional logics. At the same time, 
individuals and organizations are able to elaborate on these logics. Therefore, the two scholars 
develop a perspective on society as a potentially conflictual, inter-institutional system, in which no 
institutional order should be accorded causal primacy a priori, and individuals, organizations, and 
institutions must be seen as nested. 
Friedland and Alford (1991: 248) define institutional logic as a set of material practices and 
symbolic constructions, which constitute its organizing principles. They identify the five most 
important institutional orders in contemporary Western societies: capitalism, state, democracy, 
family, and truth (religion as well as science). The institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation 
and the commodification of human activities; that of the state is rationalization and the legal and 
bureaucratic hierarchical regulation of human activities; that of democracy is participation and 
popular control over human activities; that of family is community and unconditional loyalty to its 
members and their reproductive needs; and that of religion and science is truth whether 
transcendental or mundane. The routines of each institution are connected to rituals, some which 
define the order of the world and the individual’s position within it, and some that reinforce belief 
in the institution (p. 250). However, the conflictual institutional orders are interdependent, which 
causes uncertainty as to how to interpret a concrete practice. The two scholars therefore argue that 
some of the most important struggles among individuals, groups, organizations, and classes 
concern: a) the appropriate relationships between institutions; b) which institutional logic should 
regulate various activities; and finally c) which categories of people they apply to (p. 256).    
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Since Friedland and Alford published their article in 1991 theoretical and empirical research on 
institutional logics have become a growing domain in organization theory both in North America 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999 and 2008; Thornton et al., 2012) and Europe 
(Boxenbaum and Strandgaard Pedersen, 2009; Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013). Friedland & 
Alford originally focused on institutional logics at a societal level. In recent years, however, other 
scholars have applied the concept of institutional logics to other phenomena or levels e.g. 
organizations, markets, industries, inter-organizational networks, geographic communities, and 
organizational fields (Thornton & Ocasio 2008: 106-108). Thornton & Ocasio argue that the variety 
of levels may have led to imprecision in research, so that any logic at any level of analysis may be 
characterized as an institutional logic. They suggest that the level of institutional logics has to be 
clearly defined and that institutional logics are understood as sources of legitimacy and provide a 
sense of order and ontological security. In other words, institutional logics are more than logics of 
action or interpretative framework at the micro-level analysis, although one could potentially 
observe institutional logics at the micro-level of analysis. 
Uncertainty as to how to interpret a concrete practice opens up for micro-processes in which people 
negotiate relying on several institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011; Westenholz, 2012a). First, 
organizations may resist the introduction of what they perceive to be a contradictory institutional 
logic (Feldman, 2003). Second, organizations may react by replacing an institutional logic with 
another (Tilcsik, 2010). Third, organizations may translate different institutional logics to suit their 
local context and let these logics compete and reach a temporary truce (Borum & Westenholz, 
1995; Cooper et al., 1996). Fourth, organizations may translate several institutional logics to their 
local context and let them co-exist in the organization (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Westenholz, 2012a). 
Fifth, organizations may translate several institutional logics to their local context and develop a 
hybridized mode of material practices and symbolic constructions. (Boxenbaum, 2006; Westenholz, 
1993 and 2012a).    
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) aimed at integrating the steady growth in the development 
of empirical and theoretical research on institutional logics (focusing primarily on North American 
research) in their book The Institutional Logics Perspective. What is of special interest to this paper 
is that they develop an integrative model of the micro-foundation of institutional logics (Thornton et 
al., 2012, chapter 4). According to the model, institutional logics focus the attention of individual 
actors through institutional embeddedness, activating a social actor’s situated identities, goals, and 
action schemas and thereby shaping their social interaction. Social interactions sometimes generate 
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new social practices and structures that are selected and retained through processes of cultural 
evolution, influencing institutional logics. The scholars further argue that ‘what is important from 
an institutional logics perspective is that more micro-processes of change are built from analogies, 
combinations, translations, and adaptations of more macro-institutional logics’, and that both local 
situation and organizational embeddedness combine to explain reproduction and transformation of 
structures. The scholars are developing an integrative model combining macro-micro levels by – as 
I read it – giving ontological primacy to institutional logics in one stage of their model and 
ontological primacy to local situations in another stage of their model. 
A second point that is of interest to this paper is that Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury elaborate on 
the numbers and detailed descriptions of institutional logics. Instead of the original five institutional 
logics – capitalism, state, democracy, family, and truth (religion as well as science) – mentioned by 
Friedland and Alford in 1991, they now propose seven institutional logics: family, community, 
religion, state, market, profession, and corporation. In addition to this development, Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury make a contribution by developing nine categorical elements within each 
institutional order describing each logic by a root metaphor; sources of legitimacy, authority, and 
identity; basis of norms, attention, and strategy; informal control mechanism, and economic system.       
In a review of the book by Thornton et al., Friedland (2012) brings in different controversies and 
discussions within the institutional logic approach. I would like to mention some of them, as they 
are relevant to the comparison I make between the institutional logics approach and the 
conventional approach later on. 
First, there is a potential controversy within the institutional logic approach concerning the degree 
of ‘modularity’ of fragments or categorical elements that institutional entrepreneurs can deploy to 
transform institutional orders. Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury describe different institutional 
systems (2012: chapter 3) that apply the nine categorical elements mentioned above. They argue 
that, to a certain extent, individuals or organizations can break up the categorical elements and 
apply them to new situations to fit practical needs. The authors admit that the ability to break up 
elements might be limited but they give primacy to the modular quality of institutional logics as a 
condition of an enabling agency. Friedland, on the other hand, is much more hesitant in accepting 
the modularity of categorical elements: 
I have always, perhaps wrongly, thought of institutional logics as having limited 
modularity, where material practices are not, as they (Thornton, Ocasio and 
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Lounsbury) put it, ‘symbol-barren’ (124). That is, where identities of subjects, 
material practices, and valued objects are co-implicated, lashed together and difficult 
to decompose…That they are joined together in the social imagination is what makes 
them real, available, good to think and act with. They are world-making production 
functions; their cognitive, normative or coercive components do not travel separately.  
(Friedland, 2012: 588). 
Second, there is a dispute about the relevance of values, feelings and passions in the Institutional 
Logics approach. Although the concept ‘value’ is mentioned in the book by Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury, it does not seem to play any important role in their own development of the seven 
institutional logics and it is not mentioned as one of the categorical elements describing the logics 
(Thornton et al., 2012: 73). As Friedland (2012: 585) comments, the closest they come to 
mentioning values is in the category of ‘sources of legitimacy’. But legitimacy is not the same as 
values, although they may be related conceptually. Neither do feelings nor passions seem to play 
any role in their theorizing about institutional logics. On the contrary, Friedland argues that values 
are constitutive elements within institutional logics: 
 Value is central to an institutional logic: a presumed product of its prescribed 
practices, the foundation stone of its ontology, the source of legitimacy of its rules, a 
basis of individual identification, a ground for agency, and the foundation upon which 
its powers are constituted. (Friedland, 2012: 585). 
Furthermore, Friedland argues that values are especially essential when objectification is not in 
place and attention is not automatic, but must be ‘willed’ by the individual or organization as they 
change their world. These processes evoke intense passions, which is not surprising as these are 
moments of indeterminacy.  
Third, there is a discussion about the role of objects. As Thornton et al. (2012: 141) mention, the 
Institutional Logics approach has a blind spot concerning objects as it highlights the importance of 
wider societal belief systems. They call upon research that bridges the Institutional Logics approach 
(e.g. the actor-network theory and other more practice-based studies) in favor of more localized 
approaches to meaning making. Friedland agrees with Thornton, Ocasio and Loundbury that the 
Institutional Logics approach does not have any account of the dynamics of the material. He 
develops the argument by saying that one has to specify what is meant with more practice-based 
studies as ‘practices not only mark, they make objects.’ It is important to make a distinction here 
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between a situation where objects is a site for re-coding (practical cognitivism), and a situation 
where objects is integral and critical to the formation of particular formations of subjects and 
practical meaning making. Many objects (such as the telephone) may travel effortlessly across 
institutional fields, while other objects (such as money) may be media through which institutions 
are transformed. (Friedland, 2012: 390/391). 
These controversies and discussions within the Institutional Logics approach show that when we are 
comparing this approach to others, we have to specify what part of the approach we are referring to.        
     
COMPARING CONVENTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
The comparison of the two approaches will focus on answering four questions: What are their 
historical contexts? What are the macro-foundations of the approaches? What are the micro-
foundations of the approaches? And what are the relationships between the macro-micro 
foundations in the two approaches? I look for similarities and differences between the two 
approaches in each of these questions. In figure 1, I briefly describe my answers to the four 
questions.   
   Insert figure 1 here 
Historical theoretical context 
Both approaches were seeded in the 1980s and the first publications came out in the same year – 
1991: Conventions in France by Boltanski and Thévenot, and Institutional Logics in the USA by 
Friedland and Alford. The theoretical quest of both approaches was to understand plurality in 
society and how people dealt with indeterminacy, uncertainty and ambiguity in their day-to-day 
lives. Boltanski and Thévenot are specifically interested in understanding how people can reach 
agreements without applying violence. On the other hand, Friedland and Alford focus on 
organization as a potential conflictual, inter-institutional system without any normative (non-
violence) value built into the approach. Both approaches were seeded at a time where rational 
choice theory had a strong worldwide theoretical position – although the theory had a stronger 
position in the USA than in France. The sociologists reacted to (what they found to be) an 
oversimplification of social behavior borrowed from economics where individuals’ preferences 
were considered to be exogenous, their behavior determined by logic of consequentiality, and 
agreements were found on the marketplace. 
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Besides opposing economic theory, Boltanski and Thévenot (in their French context) also opposed 
the Durkheimian sociological alternative to economics. The Durkheimain tradition rests on the 
notion of collective norms, values etc. that people more or less consciously internalize as a 
compelling or determining factor that allows them to enter into relationships with others and reach 
collective agreements. Boltanski and Thévenot are critical of both assumptions in the rational 
choice theory and the collective theory as they are not able “to deal with the interactions of people 
in society, which both aim to do, unless they take the forms of agreement that people have 
fashioned into account.” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 32). And the two theories do not do that. 
The theoretical quest for Boltanski and Thévenot is therefore to understand the principles of 
humanity by constructing a model by focusing on moments of agreement reaching and moments of 
critical questioning as people are dealing with uncertainty.   
As mentioned above, Friedland and Alford also opposed the rational choice theory in economics. 
That was supplemented by a critique of power-oriented theories of the organization that, at that 
time, had a dominant role in the USA. In these theories, organizations are isolated from their 
institutional or societal context and society is reduced to an abstract environment or an inter-
organizational field. The theoretical quest for the two scholars was to create a nonfunctional 
perception of society as a potential contradictory inter-institutional system. And they maintained 
“an adequate social theory must work at three levels of analysis – individuals competing and 
negotiating, organizations in conflict and coordination, and institutions in contradiction and 
interdependence. Institutions must be conceived of as simultaneously material and symbolic. 
However, no institutional order should be accorded causal primacy a priory. To restore meaning 
into social analysis in a way which is neither subjectivist, functionalist, nor teleological, the notion 
of inter-institutional contradictions is vital.” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 241). This theoretical 
quest also became a critique of the more deterministic structural tendencies within neo-institutional 
organizational theory that was developing in the same period – focusing on structure, stability, and 
isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powel, 1983).  
Macro foundation 
The macro concept is contested (see Krause, 2012). When we talk about macroanalysis, we often 
mean a higher societal order (macro-level) having effects on a lower level as organizations (meso-
level) or (interactions between) individuals (micro-level). But ‘macro’ can also refer to spatial 
extensiveness or large numbers in society, and that is the meaning I apply in the paper when I talk 
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about the widespread macro-foundation of the approaches. I do not indicate by ‘macro’ that it is a 
higher level determining the ‘meso’ or ‘micro’ level. I mean that the phenomenon we are studying 
is extensively spread in society. 
Conventions, as well as Institutional Logics, have a similar macro-foundation in the sense that 
social orders as worlds or institutional logics are widespread but not unambiguously determining 
micro-processes. But their macro-foundations are also quite different or seem to be quite different.  
Thévenot (2007, 2012) identifies three regimes of engagement in society. The different regimes 
indicate different relationships between the human being and his/her environment: “the actors 
access to reality, and the way he grasps it so as to coordinate his behavior within a certain 
apprehension frame…….It is from his dependence on en engaged environment that the agent derive 
his capacity, understood as the power to maintain that engagement.” (Thévenot, 2007). First, 
Thévenot mentions the regime of engagement in public affairs, which is the regime where people 
are engaged in justification of actions by referring to different conventions – Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s book On Justification focuses specifically on this regime. Second, Thévenot defines a 
regime of familiar engagement, which consists of attachments to other people more than given 
words or asserting a will. Third, a regime of engagement in a plan, which “guarantees the autonomy 
of the bearer of an individual plan” and “refers to felicitous exercise of the will by an individual 
endowed with autonomy and of projecting herself successfully into the future.” (Thévenot, 2007). 
I understand the macro-foundation of the Institutional Logics approach as a general theory of the 
social focusing on material and symbolic practices in different institutional fields. In the original 
work by Friedland and Alford (1991), they deal with society in general. Other scholars have later 
applied the concept of institutional logics to other meso-institutional fields e.g. organizations, 
markets, industries, inter-organizational networks, geographic communities, and organizational 
fields. These institutional fields may be infused by several institutional logics creating ambiguity 
within the field.  
At first, one may be inclined to compare the ‘worlds’ within Conventions and ‘institutional logics’ 
within Institutional Logics. But before doing so I would like to ask a question concerning the 
concepts of regimes of engagements and of institutional fields. Could one argue that there are 
similarities between the regime of engagement in public affairs and a societal/organizational field 
infused with multiple institutional logics? In that case, the concepts of regimes of engagement in 
public affairs and societal/organizational fields have a limited theoretical range, as they are only 
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dealing with social situations where people justify or legitimate to others what they are doing. Or 
should one argue that whenever people are engaging with their environment (social as well as non-
social), they are making sense of what they are doing by justifying/legitimating their behavior – 
either to others or to themselves? In that case, different types of engagements might be viewed as 
one important dimension within each world or institutional logic. The unknown answers to these 
questions have profound implications on how to understand and apply the insights from the two 
approaches.          
If we set aside these unresolved questions and look at the type of social orders defined within the 
two approaches (worlds and institutional logics), they both argue that social orders may be 
transformed, new social orders may emerge, and old social orders may disappear. There is another 
similarity between the two approaches as they both mention the state and the domestic/family
3
 as 
social orders. In addition to these two orders, they mention different worlds/institutional logics 
where some are rather similar although not quite the same e.g. the market world/the logic of 
capitalism/the logic of corporation, and the civic world/the logic of democracy/the logic of 
community. And then the two approaches have some social orders that are exclusive to each 
approach e.g. the inspired world, the world of fame, the projective world within Conventions, and 
the institutional logic of religion, and logic of science within Institutional Logics. There is a need to 
expand on these similarities and differences in greater detail in future comparisons. 
Micro foundation 
Actorhood is an option in both approaches – but not as a micro-level determining factor over a 
macro-level.  
In Conventions, ‘actors’ was one of the original concepts. It is well developed within the theory, 
stressing the reflexive and strategic competences of interacting, moral actors who focus on the 
common good, engaging in public affairs. When people interact they sometimes employ different 
worlds and their actions are then put to the test, where they question the value framework to be 
applied to the situation. To reduce uncertainty, people either close their eyes, solve the 
disagreement by force, or make compromises or private arrangements. These agreements have to be 
enacted; in real-world tests they involve objects in relation to which people measure themselves and 
discover their relative worth in the world. Therefore, an agreement is not just a linguistic 
                                                          
3
 The institutional logic of the family does not only refer to the ‘private nuclear or extended family’ but could also be 
applied to relationships within organizations. It deals with the motivation of human activities by unconditional loyalty 
to community members and to their reproduction needs. (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248 and 262). 
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phenomenon, as the notion of objects and tests play a central part in their argument. (Boltanski & 
Thevenot, 1991/2006).  
In the Institutional Logics approach, ‘actors’ are mainly considered to be social-cognitive people 
applying discursive and rhetorical strategies, and persuading others to change their material 
practices and symbolic constructions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, Leca, 
2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Thornton, et al., 2012; Ziber, 2002). The possible effect of 
these processes is that people resist a new institution, or an old institutional logic is replaced by a 
new one, or institutional logics compete, co-exist, or become hybridized (Westenholz, 2012a). 
Objects and values have not played an important role in the analysis of institutional logics but, as 
Friedland (2012) mentions, they ought to be a part of the Institutional Logics approach. 
Macro-Micro foundation 
A common feature in both approaches is that they look upon their micro-macro foundation as 
interrelated or nested in some way. Exactly how they do it is not always clear but I intend, in the 
following, to give full credit to each of the approaches. 
In Conventions, the focus is on moments of tests and an important argument is that actors have the 
possibility to incorporate several worlds in a test and thereby escape macro/structural-determinism. 
This does not mean that people are ‘free’ to do whatever they want, as there are structures or worlds 
defining the identity of people and their moral obligations to a common good. But people may raise 
critical voices either within a world, or by introducing arguments from another world, in these tests. 
In this way, people depend on worlds but there is a loose coupling between these worlds and what is 
going on in tests. I therefore interpret the Conventions approach as giving ontological primacy to 
the micro-foundation without sacrificing the macro-foundation. The implication of this is that 
analysis within the Conventional approach should focus on what is happening in situated tests. 
Analysis of the tests will reveal how people get involved with each other and with objects, and how 
they discover their relative worth in the world. Analysis following these tests may also show how 
the creation and transformation of an order is happening – not as an intentional rational plan – but 
through ongoing interpretations in moments of critical questioning and agreement reaching. 
In the Institutional Logics approach, it is assumed that interests, identities, values, world-views, and 
material practices of individuals and organizations are embedded in multiple institutional logics. At 
the same time, individuals and organizations are able to elaborate on these logics. Therefore, society 
is regarded as a potentially conflictual, inter-institutional system, in which no institutional order 
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should be accorded causal primacy a priori, and individuals, organizations, and institutions must be 
seen as nested (Friedland & Alford, 1991). This opens up for micro-processes in which people 
negotiate relying on several institutional logics. In a later article, Friedland (2009: 909/910) 
advocates institutional logics being the bases for evaluation and coordination. Therefore, he gives 
ontological primacy to institutional logics. He further argues that transforming institutional logics in 
blending processes may be difficult as the modularity of an institutional logic is limited as 
institutional logics are sticky. Alternatively, assimilation, the replacement of an institutional logic 
by another, or the segregation of institutional logics, are more plausible. These arguments are partly 
undermined by Thornton et al. (2012: chapter 4) in “an integrative model of the micro-foundation of 
institutional logics”. According to the model, institutional logics focus the attention of individual 
actors through institutional embeddedness, by activating a social actor’s situated identities, goals, 
and action schemas – and thereby shaping their social interaction. Social interactions sometimes 
generate new social practices and structures that are selected and retained through processes of 
cultural evolution, which influence institutional logics. The scholars further argue that “what is 
important from an institutional logics perspectives is that more micro-processes of change are built 
from analogies, combinations, translations, and adaptations of more macro-institutional logics”, and 
that both local situation and organizational embeddedness combine to explain reproduction and 
transformation of structures. Combining different institutional logics is possible in their model, as 
they argue that modularity is possible and institutional logics are regarded as sort of a toolbox. 
From my interpretation of their text, the three scholars are developing an integrative model that 
combines macro-micro levels by giving ontological primacy to macro/meso-institutional logics in 
one stage of their model (when they want to understand individuals’ identities, goals, attentions, and 
actions schemas), and ontological primacy to local situations in another stage of their model (when 
they want to understand how macro-institutional logics are transformed). 
 
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS TO CONVENTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Both Conventions and Institutional Logics are dealing with indeterminacy, uncertainty and 
ambiguity in social life and trying to overcome the simplification of dichotomies such as macro-
micro and structure-actorhood that have haunted the social sciences. Both approaches have enriched 
our analyses and deserve our attention. However, celebrating approaches is not the same as 
accepting them uncritically and I would like to make some comments and raise some clarification 
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questions about both approaches. 
Comments and Questions to Conventions  
Firstly, Conventions was developed for the purpose of understanding how people coordinate their 
activities through reaching agreements and justifying their actions to a third person by referring to a 
common good within a world or a compromise between worlds. I would like to suggest that we 
expand Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach of justification to at least two other types of situations. 
First, when people coordinate their activities with others they may make sense of the interaction by 
justifying what they are doing by applying the different worths and worlds developed by Boltanski 
and Thévenot. They don’t necessarily get into a dispute in the process of coordination, but justify 
what is going on to themselves and/or to an interviewer. Second, when people coordinate their 
activities – they do not necessarily reach an agreement. I have applied – perhaps by ‘mistake’ – the 
work by Boltanski and Thévenot in a study of coordination within commercial open source 
development (Westenholz, 2012a) to both situations. The analysis shows that coordination did not 
always take place because people thought alike within one world or within a compromise between 
worlds. Coordination sometimes took place because people performed common activities, but did 
not agree on the meaning of this particular action. For example, some companies released 
knowledge to an open community and, in their view, gained worth by combining the market world 
and the civic world. While other companies released knowledge and, in their view, gained worth by 
combining arguments from the industrial world and the market world. Companies were not 
justifying the release of their knowledge to others. They justified it to themselves and/or to me. In 
this sense, the analysis moved from a regime of arrangements in public affairs to a regime of 
arrangements where people only justify to each other some of the time. In this example, they only 
did it amongst themselves (or to me), whilst still coordinating their activities. The application of the 
different worlds seemed to work, although I was told from one anonymous journal reviewer that I 
did not apply Conventions ‘in the right way’. If one accepts that Boltanski and Thévenot’s work can 
be applied not only within ‘public affairs’ but also in other situated social contexts, I argue that 
Conventions moves closer to the Institutional Logics approach on this dimension of the macro-
foundation. But is this argument acceptable within the approach? 
Secondly, Conventions was developed based on Western philosophy. Does that imply that it may 
not be a helpful (or a less helpful) theoretical approach to study the coordination of people living in 
Asian or African countries? I raise this question as I am studying Chinese companies located in 
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Denmark (Westenholz, 2013a). When the Chinese and the Danes coordinate their activities and 
define their relative worth through tests, it appears that Chinese people sometimes enact what I have 
called a ‘fuzzy world’ (fast and close adapting), which is unknown to most Western people. On the 
other hand, Danish people sometimes enact a ‘civic world’ (discussing problems and solutions 
together on equal terms), which is unknown to most working Chinese people. This raises a question 
about which worlds are available for people to enact in concrete tests. I do not suggest that we go 
back to national cultural studies à la Hofstede, but we may have to understand that people might 
have access to different worlds when they coordinate their activities. In relation to this issue, one 
could ask if the concept of organizational fields could be a helpful concept to import from the 
Institutional Logics approach. (See also Clotier and Langley (2013: 373-375) for a similar 
argument.) Organizational fields could then be regarded as a dynamic phenomenon embedded by 
specific worlds defined by ongoing processes between people and organizations. McInerney (2008) 
is making a contribution to combining organizational fields and Conventions, as he investigates 
how change in an organizational field is analyzed by drawing on orders of worth. His shows how 
institutional entrepreneurs shape organizational fields by attempting to conventionalize accounts, 
and thereby convincing powerful actors in the field to accept those accounts without question.    
Thirdly, one might ask how we study the emergence or transformation of worlds. Boltanski and 
Thévenot touched on this issue in Justification (1991). However, it was not the main focus of the 
book and compromises between worlds were regarded as fragile as compromises did not have a 
solid foundation. On the other hand, it was argued that a compromise could be solidified by 
blending objects of elements stemming from different worlds at the service of the common good 
and providing them with their own identities so they could not be recognized if one of the elements 
were removed. How that happened was not unfolded. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005) focus on a new emerging ‘projective world’. They argue that the principal 
operator of creation and transformation of an order derives its energy from sources of indignation. 
Transformation is neither seen as the outcome of an overall strategy developed and implemented 
from above, nor is it an unconscious process, without a subject or reflexivity. Transformations are 
understood as interpretable in terms, and they are established in historical circumstances where an 
increase in the speed and number of displacements brings about significant changes (p. 522). The 
study by Boltanski and Chiapello is impressive but we need many more studies that explore how 
micro-processes could intentionally or unintentionally result in the transformation of worlds or 
emerging new worlds. Inspiration may come from some of the practice studies within Institutional 
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Logics (e.g. Christensen and Westenholz, 1997, 2001; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007).           
Comments and Questions to Institutional Logics     
Has Institutional Logics thrown some ‘babies out with the bathwater’ as the approach became more 
established? This question comes to light in some of the controversies between Friedland on one 
side and Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury on the other.  
First, Friedland argues that the modularity of fragments within Institutional Logics is limited – 
whereas Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury build on the idea that the elements within different 
institutional logics are like a toolbox, where elements can be blended into new institutional logics. 
One could argue that it is an empirical question, and I believe that Friedland, as well as Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury, would agree on that. On the other hand, I also sense a difference between 
them. Friedland argues that institutional logics have a limited modularity and they are difficult to 
break down, whereas Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury focus on the ability to recombine elements 
from institutional logics into new ones. This may just be different ways of expressing the same 
phenomenon (i.e. Is the glass half full or half empty?). But for me, Friedland seems to be more in 
line with Conventions in this discussion, where compromises are fragile and difficult to stabilize 
over a longer period of time. 
Second, values and feelings are more or less absent in the mature version of Institutional Logics, 
whereas they are fundamental to Friedland’s view on Institutional Logics. Once again, Friedland is 
more in line with Conventions where the moral sense of people is central in people’s engagement 
within public affairs. Feelings like passions, excitement, self-love, desire etc. are also more central 
to some of the different worlds defined within Conventions.   
Third, objects are more or less not present in the later version of Institutional Logics and “it appears 
as though institutional logics are located at the level of language, as though symbol and category 
float free from materiality” (Friedland, 2012: 589). Friedland criticizes this linguistic turn as he 
regards material practices as integral to institutional symbolism, and material practices operate 
through and on objects: “practices not only mark, they make object” (Friedland, 2012: 590). Once 
again, Friedland’s argument is closer to the Conventions approach where the relationship between 
objects and humans plays an important role.  
We do not want to deal with these objects as pure carriers of symbolic meanings, as 
sociologists often do. We want, on the contrary, to show the way persons, in order to 
cope with uncertainty, rely on things, objects, devices which are used as stable 
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references, on which reality tests or trial can be based. (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 
367). 
To bring objects and materiality back into Institutional Logics, I would suggest that Institutional 
Logics adopts the idea of ‘a test’ within the framework of Conventions. (See also Dansou and 
Langley, 2012 and Westenholz, 2013a for a similar suggestion.) A test in social practices involves 
both humans and objects and I would like to suggest that it happen in at least two different ways. If 
people strategize about objects (which managers often do when they talk about objects and 
materiality), the test scenario is often a site for coding and re-coding founded on discursive devices. 
On the other hand, if people not only talk about objects but also work with objects (e.g. 
programmers), then test scenarios are of a different kind where objects are an integral part of the 
test. Federspiel developed the distinction between situations where people ‘talk about things’ and 
where people ‘work with things’ in a working paper (2013) on how material practices influence the 
institutionalization of digitalization.  
Bringing the idea of ‘a test’ into Institutional Logics would also strengthen relational analyses. 
Theoretically, Institutional Logics has a relational foundation, but many analyses prioritize a focus 
on actors and how they maintain or change institutions. The analyses often do not prioritize a focus 
on the relationship between actors. If test scenarios are brought into Institutional Logics, 
relationships between actors and between actors and objects would be a natural part of the analyses 
– as well as a deeper understanding of the sense making and meaning construction taking place 
during these tests.  
 
CONCLUSION 
People and organizations must increasingly coordinate their activities in indeterminate, uncertain or 
ambiguous situations as they navigate across multiple orders. I focus on two theoretical approaches 
in the paper – Conventions and Institutional Logics – that have the purpose of understanding how 
people deal with living in such situations. Both approaches were developed in the mid-1980s as a 
reaction to rational choice theory, which had a strong worldwide theoretical position at that time 
(probably more in the USA than in France). The scholars reacted to (what they found to be) an 
oversimplification of social behavior borrowed from economics where individuals’ preferences 
were considered to be exogenous, their behavior determined by logic of consequentiality, and 
agreements were found on the marketplace. They also reacted to different macro-sociological 
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approaches founded on the notion of collective norms, values, and cognitive schemas etc., which 
people more or less consciously internalized as a compelling or determining factor that allowed 
them to enter into rather unambiguous relationships with others and reach collective agreements. 
The purpose of both approaches was to overcome the actor-micro foundation of economics and the 
structure-macro foundation of sociology so that the indeterminacy and ambiguity of our lives could 
be understood. Although they have this common purpose, the two approaches have developed in 
different ways in France and in the USA and not much dialog has taken place between them. This is 
the reason why I am interested in ‘opening the box’ of each theoretical approach, bringing them 
together, and discussing their similarities and differences – as well as commenting on how they 
might learn from each other without losing their own identities as distinct theoretical approaches. 
The aim of the paper is therefore not to combine the approaches, but to start a dialog between them 
with each theory mirroring each other.   
When the two theoretical approaches are face-to-face, we can see that they both have a purpose in 
helping us to understand indeterminacy, uncertainty and ambiguity in society; they both identify 
different widespread social orders that may change over time; they both recognize that actorhood is 
important for the transformation of social orders; and they have both developed an understanding of 
how social orders and actorhood are interrelated. These similarities are essential common ground 
for starting a dialog. However, the interesting part of the dialog starts when we focus on the 
differences between the two theoretical approaches.  
From the Conventions perspective, Institutional Logics is a more general social theory, whereas 
Conventions is defined as an approach that only deals with engagement in public affairs and not in 
engagements of familiarity and planning. Could the distinction between the two approaches be 
toned down? I am not suggesting to delete the distinction but to expand the scope of Convention by 
including engagement in situations where people coordinate their activities without having a 
common understanding of what they are doing. Second, when Conventions looks at Institutional 
Logics, a concept such as ‘organizational fields’ can be observed, which is foreign to Conventions. 
Could ‘organizational fields’ be a helpful concept to Conventions in understanding that different 
worlds are not available in all engagements in public affairs? (For example, some Eastern worlds 
may not be easily available for people in the West and not yet included in the approach.) Or should 
such a problem be dealt with in another way within Conventions? 
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From the Institutional Logics perspective, Conventions build on the assumption that 
elements/dimensions within a world are not easily broken up and compromises between worlds are 
assumed to be fragile. As this is in contradiction to the ‘toolbox’ assumption within – at least some 
later versions of – Institutional Logics, one could ask what the analytical worth of ‘an institutional 
logic’ is if the concept can be easily modulated. Why then not just work with ‘institutional 
elements/dimensions’ with a high degree of modularity and save institutional logics as an analytical 
concept with limited modularity? Second, when Institutional Logics looks at Conventions, feelings 
and moral values emerge as phenomena that are not strongly represented within Institutional 
Logics. Should feelings and moral values be imported into Institutional Logics, and how could that 
be done? Thirdly, although both approaches have a focus on practice, Conventions has a stronger 
focus on objects and on interactions in test scenarios. Institutional Logics is well on its way to 
accepting the inclusion of objects, but would it also be helpful for the theory to develop a stronger 
sense of interactions in test scenarios? 
These are some of the questions that I think are worthy of discussion between and within each 
approach – and many more issues may be relevant. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Conventions and Institutional Logics are not the only theoretical 
approaches developed in the last thirty years with the purpose of helping us to understand 
indeterminacy, uncertainty or ambiguity in people’s lives. But it is interesting to bring them 
together as they were developed on different continents. Other options could be to bring theories 
such as the actor-network theory (e.g. Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1983; Guggenheim and 
Potthast, 2012; Latour, 1993), institutional work theory (e.g. Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009; Zilber, 2013), and social performance theory (e.g. Alexander, 
2006) into the debate.                      
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Similarities between 
Conventions and 
Institutional Logics 
 
Differences between  
Conventions and Institutional Logics 
 
Conventions Institutional Logics 
Historical 
theoretical context: 
   
Seeded when and 
where 
Developed in 1980s. 
First published in 1991. 
Seeded in France. 
 
Seeded in USA. 
 
Theoretical quest Understanding plurality and 
ambiguity in society. 
Understanding the principles 
of common humanity. 
Dealing with individual 
uncertainty without applying 
violence. 
Dealing with organizations 
as a potential conflictual, 
inter-institutional system. 
Critical of other 
theoretical 
approaches 
Critical of rational choice theory. 
 
Critical of Durkheimian 
sociology. 
 
Critical of the utilitarian 
individual. 
Critical of power-oriented 
organizational theory. 
Implicit critic of 
determinism within neo-
institutional theory. 
Macro foundation:     
Macro scope Widespread social orders – not as a 
determining macro-level over a 
micro-level. 
Limited to understanding the 
regime of engagement in 
public affairs – not the 
regime of engagement in 
familiarity or the regime of 
engagement in planning. 
General social theory of the 
societal level and different 
institutional field levels. 
Type of social orders State and family. 
Other social orders may emerge 
and/or be defined. 
Social orders defined as 
‘worlds’ such as:  
the inspired world, the world 
of fame, the civic world,  the 
market world, the industrial 
world 
(and the state and family 
world). 
Social orders defined as 
‘institutional logics’ such as:  
capitalism, democracy,    
truth (Friedland)  
community, religion, 
profession, corporation, 
market (Thornton, Ocasio 
and Lounsbury) 
(and the state and family 
institutional logic). 
Micro foundation     
Micro scope Agency is possible during 
interaction – but not as a 
determining micro-level over a 
macro-level. 
  
Focus within micro-
processes 
 Focus on moments of 
agreement reaching and 
moment of critical 
questioning. 
Moral sense. 
Focus on symbolic devices.  
Practice. 
Objects. 
(Friedland) 
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Tests. 
Objects. 
Compromises. 
Values and feelings. 
(Friedland) 
Macro-Micro 
foundation: 
   
The relationship 
between micro-macro 
 Macro and micro are interrelated Although the room to 
maneuver is limited, actors 
have the possibility of 
incorporating several worlds 
in a test and thereby 
escaping macro-
determinism. 
Indignation is a driving force 
in critique, which is a 
principal operator of creation 
and transformation of an 
order. These shifts are 
neither seen as the outcome 
of an overall strategy 
developed and implemented 
from above, nor are they an 
unconscious process, 
without a subject or 
reflexivity. They are 
understood as interpretable 
in terms. 
Institutional logics are 
available for organizations 
and individuals to elaborate. 
(Friedland) 
 
Institutional logics focus the 
attention of individuals, 
activating situated identities, 
goals, and action schemas 
and thereby shaping social 
interaction. Social 
interaction results in 
practices that are selected 
through processes of cultural 
evolution from which 
institutional logics emerge at 
the levels of society, 
institutional field, and 
organizations. (Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury) 
Modularity of the 
social orders 
 Strictly limited modularity – 
compromise is possible but 
often fragile. 
Strictly limited modularity – 
assimilation, replacement 
and segregation are possible. 
(Friedland) 
Modularity is possible – and 
sometimes blending the 
result. (Thornton, Ocasio 
and Lounsbury) 
 
